WHAT SHOULD UNITED STATES' AFGHANISTAN POLICY BE - PART I

Objective:
· To make sure Taliban and Al-Qaeda do not get control of Afghanistan and start their fiefdom all over again;
· To make sure there is a democratically elected govt in Afghanistan which is ally of US and West;
· To make sure Afghanistan stands on its own feet economically with out the poppy crop revenue;
· To make sure Taliban and Al-Qaeda base in Pakistan is dismantled;
· To make sure Pakistan does not play the double game w.r.t Taliban and Al-Qaeda with US;
· To eliminate as many Al-Qaeda and Taliban (especially the bad Taliban; better get rid of any Taliban) as possible;
· To establish a credible, dependable and functional western intel network in the region.

Sub set of objectives:
· To make sure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secured from falling in to radical elements’ hands;
· To make sure opium exports from Afghanistan is curtailed to as low volume as possible;
· Pakistan is weaned away from supporting and providing conducive environment for the Islamic radical elements.

Why above objectives are important to US, Western allies:
If Taliban get control of Afghanistan, they could potentially cause damage to western interests by:
· Providing safe refuge to AL- Qaeda to live and expand;
· Sub-contracting offshore attacks to AL- Qaeda;
· Trying to increase sphere of influence – first in the region and then beyond (in ME, South Asia, Asia Pacific);
· Destabilising nearby countries, like, Kyrgyzstan, who are supportive of US and West;
· Creating more and more training grounds for AL- Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pak and other places;
· Systematically trying to nibble more and more area of Pakistan with eventual aim to grab the whole country;
· Increasing opium smuggling to West in menacing proportions;
· Increasing its financial base to make it strong and secure.

Aspects that will be key to success of Af-Pak objectives:
· How far the west's so-called technological advancement can be successfully put in use by US/ISAF;
· How far Pakistan can be made supportive to US/NATO objectives;
· How far Karzai, war lords cooperate and support US/NATO objectives.

Other aspects key for success of Af-Pak objectives:

Military -
· AQ and Taliban need to be taken out;
· Pakistan’s (ISI’s) support to AL-QAEDA and especially to Taliban needs to be cut off totally;
· AL- Qaeda and Taliban’s numbers need to be assessed realistically – region-wise/area-wise

Political -
· Karzai needs to ensure better governance – less corruption, cronyism etc.;
· Karzai needs to put in place proper governance machinery in the whole country;
· The war lords need to be aligned with US/NATO objectives (and support democratically elected govt in Kabul).

Economic -
· Karzai needs to ensure US and international monetary aid trickles down to poor and low middle class
· Democratically elected govt in Kabul needs to provide progress report on utilization of US and international monetary aid;
· Need to create alternative job opportunities (alternative to working on opium fields) and offer jobs to poor people.

Other -
· International sources of funds to AL- Qaeda and Taliban need to be cut off;
· Need to get Europe to commit more resources – troops and money.

WHAT SHOULD UNITED STATES' AFGHANISTAN POLICY BE - Part II

Actions needed to achieve aforesaid objectives:

With Pakistan -
· Adopt tough carrot and stick policy with Pakistani regime;
· Get Pakistan to live without being obsessed with India - provide Pakistan some non-harmful alternative reason to be proud of and be busy with;
· Keep continual pressure and vigilance on ISI – use carrot and stick with key people and buy their support/allegiance;
· Always double-check any so-called key intel, important tactical advice provided by Pak;
· DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST PAKISTAN;
· Seek intel from India and Israel and cross-check Pak’s intel always.

Military tactics -
· Adopt pincer-like movement in cutting off AL- Qaeda /Taliban and taking them out (Pakistan to push from South and US/ISAF pushes from North) in Southern Afghanistan;
· Adopt similar tactics in other areas of Afghanistan;
· Use advanced technology to detect IED’s from distance, intercept messages, locate enemy, blast underground network etc.;
· Use devastating air attacks where civilian casualties are not likely at all;
· Increase troop levels in regions/areas as required.
· Allow some Taliban to escape to China’s Uyghur region, Iran to create trouble there.

Economic -
· Karzai to make sure job opportunities are visibly available and achievable to poor;
· Karzai to make sure small business opportunities are available to masses;
· Keep providing monetary and other aid to Afghanistan.

Set time frame for Karzai -
· Keep pressure on Karzai to develop further Afghanistan’s own security and police base/network in a given time frame (3-5 years)
· Evaluate periodically Karzai’s performance against given KPI’s

Other -
· On a dual track approach explore if some Taliban are willing to join democratic process (but do not get obsessed with finding out good Taliban / bad Taliban);
· Take out/eliminate private fund providers to Taliban (most of them operate in Gulf and ME, some in Europe);
· Keep up an international media blitz that moderate Islamic elements are being courted and radical elements being eliminated;
· Keep an eye on China’s game in region;
· US/NATO to maintain an unified, aligned and integrated approach.
· Do not piss India off.

TO SUCCEED IN AFGHANISTAN UNITED STATES WILL FIRST NEED TO UNDO ITS NEFARIOUS SOUTH ASIAN POLICIES OF THE 1990s

For the following major US and ISAF losses in one day in Afghanistan:
· Oct 2009: Eight US die in Taliban attack in Nuristan, eastern Afghanistan close to Pak border;
· Sept 2009: Six Italian soldiers die in suicide bomb in Kabul;
· Aug 2008: Ten French troops killed in ambush in Sarobi, east of Kabul;
· July 2008: Nine US soldiers die in militant siege in Wanar, bordering Nuristan and Wanar provinces;
· Nov 2007: Six US soldiers and three Afghan troops killed in ambush;
· July 2007: Six Canadian soldiers and Afghan interpreter die when vehicle hits IED in Kandahar province;
· May 2007: Five US, one UK, one Canadian soldier die in hostile attack on helicopter in Helmand province;
· June 2005: Sixteen US soldiers die in attack on helicopter in Konar province; and counting…..

if one had to point toward one major reason, then it would have to be the former President Bill Clinton. And, this is not being said because one is anti-Democrat or pro-Republican. Any impartial, objective analysis of US policies in South Asian region of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan would unequivocally bring out that in 1990s United States pursued a nefarious policy of ‘overlook what Pakistan (and Saudi) is doing in the region’.

Since the buck stops at the table of US President, therefore, the responsibility of policy of deliberate callous indifference towards the diabolical games played by Pakistan in ‘90s must be attributed to then US President – Clinton. Clinton’s era was one of the worst from US foreign policy perspective.

What happened on 9/11 was the direct consequence of Clinton administration's callous indifference alluded to above. President Bush went in to Afghanistan like a mad bull in rage. However, he continued to indulge Pakistani leadership and get fooled (most of the time knowingly) by Pakistani chicanery.

Either Bush was incapable or he was, like his Republican predecessors, more anti-Indian; whatever it was he could not unravel the rogue Pakistan was (and is). Like a fool he continued to play in the hands of the Pakistanis. Result? US and ISAF continued to bleed in Afghanistan.

But Bush's Afghanistan strategy was more of a band aid because he had not fathomed the Clinton-era mistakes nor he had the inclination to do so either. He had no clue of what would be the best strategy or what it should be predicated on! He was too bogged down in Iraq, and he and his advisers were too incapable of figuring out anything sensible beyond Iraq.

Going back to Clinton - regardless of whatever the so-called biographers of Bill Clinton may say or write about the characteristics of the former President, one thing is for sure – Clinton had a pathological aversion (or shall we say, inability) to taking major decisions, especially, related to military geo-politics. Clinton exhibited classic ostrich-like behaviour when it came to dealing with potential or real armed conflict issues.

Clinton liked to be an ‘escapist’ (probably he still does) and under the self-created illusion that everything is fine devilishly revelled in procrastination and avoidance. In case of South Asian region he deliberately overlooked what was going on in the region. Following were some of the notable situations:
· Pakistan was aiding Taliban to overrun Afghanistan so as to control that area indirectly;
· Saudi Arabia was promoting radical Islam (Wahabism) by pumping money in that region (and elsewhere in the moderate Islamic communities);
· Pakistan was fostering terrorism in Kashmir and countless innocent Indians were dying;
· Pakistan, through its nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, was not only developing its own nuclear capability but also transferring the deadly technology to North Korea, Iran and others;
· Pakistan was channelling US military and civilian aid to further its own military build up;
· Pakistan’s Shia politicians were colluding with Iran to help expand its influence in the region.

It will be disastrous to assume that CIA did not know about the above and much more and was not keeping the President and his advisers informed (if CIA indeed failed to notice and/or track the above, then God bless the US!). But President Clinton chose to overlook all this. Why? Possibly because apart from being an incorrigible ‘escapist’ that he was, he thought that there was NO potential direct (or may even indirect) impact on an American due to whatever Pakistan or Saudi Arabia was doing!! He thought “oh why bother, things are happening thousands of miles away from US shores”.

But this psychopathic philanderer probably forgot what the geniuses of political science have said from ancient times – be it Chanakya or Sun Tzu – to the modern times that to maintain political and military influence one needs to anticipate far ahead what can happen in the coming times. Sun Tzu mentions at one place in his book (The Art of War): ...A leader must be “serene and inscrutable" and capable of comprehending "unfathomable plans".

But then that’s the price a country pays for electing someone whose dick reigns rather than the cerebral competencies. If history is impartial and someday people reflect on past presidents of US, there will be a general consensus that Clinton’s era was a disaster in terms of statesmanship and foreign policy; Clinton failed miserably in its task of protecting US by failing to anticipate and act proactively where it was required.
[Sidebar comment: The so-called economic prosperity seen during Clinton presidency was a result of previous policies already put in place, he was just lucky to reap the fruits]

One may ask, why bring in all the past, Clinton and all, in today’s discussion on Afghanistan strategy? Again, the answer is simple: if you don’t analyze what might have been the cause for a given current situation, how do you assess and arrive at the best option! And, mind you, the top US general in the region Gen Stanley McChrystal is asking for a "dramatically different" strategy to ensure success there.

So, how do you arrive at a "dramatically different" strategy if you don’t know what went wrong in the first place; if you don’t know what has been going on for all these years in the region? What are the areas that need to be fixed to achieve success of the mission? If President Obama and his advisers want to arrive at the ‘best’ option, they will have to look at the past with an open and impartial mind, analyze with the mind set of nobody is a ‘holy cow’, explode old shibboleths, and then come to the conclusion on the best path forward.

Taliban can be defeated. And by the way, President Obama keeps harping on the word Al-Qaeda without mentioning Taliban in his speeches. One hopes he knows that ‘real’ enemy of US and ISAF are the Taliban, Al-Qaeda are just riding piggy back to synergize and cause maximum damage. Anyway, back to Afghanistan: US and the international community can defeat the Islamic radical monsters – created to a large extent by the aid and abetment of Pakistan and Saudis – but it would need a sustained campaign.

How should that campaign be run, that will be the subject of next blog.

PRESIDENT OBAMA’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY AND THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT - ISI

In his first primetime press conference on 09 Feb when US President Obama didn’t mention the word ‘Taliban’ while responding to a question on his administration’s Afghanistan policy, it was clear something was cooking. The omission of the word ‘Taliban’ came as a bit of a surprise because till this presser whenever President Obama spoke about threats to US from Afghan-Pakistan area, he always mentioned Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the same breath.

Be that as it may, it is now clear that US does not wish to look at Taliban through one coloured lens – US wishes to distinguish between ‘good’ Taliban and ‘bad’ Taliban. Ostensibly, the motivation for this thinking comes from supposed success in Iraq where some Sunni elements hostile towards US apparently switched sides and started working with the coalition forces in fighting insurgency.

Clearly, US is trying to devise a strategy for Afghanistan which will prevent it from getting bogged down in that area in Vietnam-like manner. Hopefully, lessons learned from Vietnam are apparently being applied to make sure that US doesn’t have to leave Afghan theatre with a bloody nose, mutilated prestige and negative gain on the ledger.

Extending the logic of success in Iraq to Afghanistan is conceptually tenable. But what about translating that in to reality? Are the scenarios identical? What are the additional challenges? Surely, US strategists must have carried out necessary SWOT and other analyses – one hopes they did so! Incidentally, one had hoped that US had done necessary home work about post-Saddam scenario in Iraq also but sadly that proved to be so hopelessly untrue!

Anyway, it seems that US thinks that Taliban being a Sunni outfit will be amenable more or less in the same way as the Iraqi Sunni elements turned out to be. As well, the American policy makers are hoping that there will be support from Pakistan in making the new policy initiative successful. It seems that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is also in favour of this vector of new US Afghan policy.

But here is the fly in the ointment – Pakistan – and this could be potentially serious. Why? Because, Pakistan (through ISI) was a co-sponsor of Taliban when Soviets had occupied Afghanistan. But after the Soviets withdrew from that region, Pakistan (through ISI) continued to keep Taliban alive because it served them in more than one way.

By keeping Taliban alive and active, Pakistan’s dangerously shrewd and mean SOB's in politics and in ISI could continue to have foothold in Afghanistan, devilishly prise out American aid, keep fingering India, and last but not the least hold on to their positions of power.

Just to provide brief historical context, Pakistan’s former dictators Zial-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were America’s darlings because they were so good in licking the boots of their American masters and also convincing them that US interests in the region are safe with them (Zia or Musharraf). Taliban was a good pawn in this political chess game Pakistan played for last so many years vis-à-vis US.

Washington probably understood how the mean schmuck Pakistanis (including ISI) were pulling wool over US eyes but the Americans chose to ignore (if they didn’t understand the Pakistani game, then God bless them!). Anyway, after 9/11 things changed, albeit very slowly, in Washington. During his second term President Bush started realising there was more benefit in cooperating with India (e.g. civil nuclear cooperation).

In order to win India’s confidence US started to acknowledge, more in private though, the dangers posed by ISI's support to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Slowly, US started to acknowledge in public also the areas where Musharraf had to do more with regard to Pakistan's support to Taliban and Islamic insurgents than his usual theatricals.

But the 26/11 Mumbai attack completely changed everything. This attack reinforced the fact that Pakistan was indeed the epicentre of Islamic terrorism, and was playing double game with US with regard to Taliban and even Al-Qaeda. The reported killing of American intelligence operatives, and the Jews in the Mumbai attack forced the Americans to take serious note of Pakistan’s dubious role in the whole game.

Consequently, the Americans are infuriated, rightly so, and they want to get down to the bottom of the sinister plot. So are the Israelis, and given their unfettered clout in Washington they are kicking their American counterparts to punish the perpetrators. Both US and Israelis know the diabolical role of ISI in all this.

US probably is aware that Pakistan hates President Karzai and Pakistan will do everything possible to destabilise him. Taliban is one of the instruments Pakistan uses to play its dirty game against Karzai and anybody and everybody who support Karzai – including the American troops and ISAF. Pakistan plays this sinister game through ISI. No wonder American troops and ISAF are finding their task in containing Taliban getting difficult by the day.

Ultimately, Americans are now realising that it is about time they wielded the hobnailed boot with Pakistan and some how brought a stop to ISI’s support to Taliban. US knows (so does Canada and other constituents of ISAF) that unless ISI is disciplined and Pakistan stops providing safe haven to Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in FAR and NWFP, chances of gaining any upper hand against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is next to impossible.

US Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, eventually couldn’t be more candid about ISI. In an interview with PBS broadcast recently he said that (Pakistan Army Chief and de-facto boss of ISI) Kayani "certainly is aware of the concerns that I have with respect to his intelligence agency, ISI".

"They (ISI) have been very attached to many of these extremist organizations," Mullen said warning that "in the long run, they have got to completely cut ties with those in order to really move in the right direction". Kayani, he said, had appointed in Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, "one of his best guys", as the new director of ISI. "I'm encouraged with his views and I'm encouraged with how he sees the problem." But "it's going to take some time to get at it inside ISI".

So, in summary, the new US Afghan policy of engaging with ‘good’ Taliban may not bear any fruit whatsoever unless and until the chief actor of the dangerous Islamic insurgency game – Pakistan and ISI – is properly corralled and contained. US should learn from history (their strategists have a bad habit of not reading history) that elements in modern day Pakistan and the Afghan-Pak border areas could be contained only through sledge hammer policy (refer to early 20th century Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his general Hari Singh Nalwa’s tactics in the region).

One hopes President Obama and his advisors will learn from history and move forward carefully with force (and some carrots) without getting fooled by Pakistani chicanery. Only if they can do so, they will be able to minimise losses to American troops and ISAF and at the same time achieve their objective of containing Islamic insurgency threat to USA and other western countries. And while doing so for God’s sake US should not get blindsided and/or misguided by agenda-driven advice from the wily British. USA has for so long been deceived and misguided by British advice on South Asian matters. It is time US used its own brain while developing strategies for the Afghan-Pakistan theatre.