Objective:
· To make sure Taliban and Al-Qaeda do not get control of Afghanistan and start their fiefdom all over again;
· To make sure there is a democratically elected govt in Afghanistan which is ally of US and West;
· To make sure Afghanistan stands on its own feet economically with out the poppy crop revenue;
· To make sure Taliban and Al-Qaeda base in Pakistan is dismantled;
· To make sure Pakistan does not play the double game w.r.t Taliban and Al-Qaeda with US;
· To eliminate as many Al-Qaeda and Taliban (especially the bad Taliban; better get rid of any Taliban) as possible;
· To establish a credible, dependable and functional western intel network in the region.
Sub set of objectives:
· To make sure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secured from falling in to radical elements’ hands;
· To make sure opium exports from Afghanistan is curtailed to as low volume as possible;
· Pakistan is weaned away from supporting and providing conducive environment for the Islamic radical elements.
Why above objectives are important to US, Western allies:
If Taliban get control of Afghanistan, they could potentially cause damage to western interests by:
· Providing safe refuge to AL- Qaeda to live and expand;
· Sub-contracting offshore attacks to AL- Qaeda;
· Trying to increase sphere of influence – first in the region and then beyond (in ME, South Asia, Asia Pacific);
· Destabilising nearby countries, like, Kyrgyzstan, who are supportive of US and West;
· Creating more and more training grounds for AL- Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pak and other places;
· Systematically trying to nibble more and more area of Pakistan with eventual aim to grab the whole country;
· Increasing opium smuggling to West in menacing proportions;
· Increasing its financial base to make it strong and secure.
Aspects that will be key to success of Af-Pak objectives:
· How far the west's so-called technological advancement can be successfully put in use by US/ISAF;
· How far Pakistan can be made supportive to US/NATO objectives;
· How far Karzai, war lords cooperate and support US/NATO objectives.
Other aspects key for success of Af-Pak objectives:
Military -
· AQ and Taliban need to be taken out;
· Pakistan’s (ISI’s) support to AL-QAEDA and especially to Taliban needs to be cut off totally;
· AL- Qaeda and Taliban’s numbers need to be assessed realistically – region-wise/area-wise
Political -
· Karzai needs to ensure better governance – less corruption, cronyism etc.;
· Karzai needs to put in place proper governance machinery in the whole country;
· The war lords need to be aligned with US/NATO objectives (and support democratically elected govt in Kabul).
Economic -
· Karzai needs to ensure US and international monetary aid trickles down to poor and low middle class
· Democratically elected govt in Kabul needs to provide progress report on utilization of US and international monetary aid;
· Need to create alternative job opportunities (alternative to working on opium fields) and offer jobs to poor people.
Other -
· International sources of funds to AL- Qaeda and Taliban need to be cut off;
· Need to get Europe to commit more resources – troops and money.
Showing posts with label Hamid Karzai. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hamid Karzai. Show all posts
Sunday, November 29, 2009
WHAT SHOULD UNITED STATES' AFGHANISTAN POLICY BE - Part II
Actions needed to achieve aforesaid objectives:
With Pakistan -
· Adopt tough carrot and stick policy with Pakistani regime;
· Get Pakistan to live without being obsessed with India - provide Pakistan some non-harmful alternative reason to be proud of and be busy with;
· Keep continual pressure and vigilance on ISI – use carrot and stick with key people and buy their support/allegiance;
· Always double-check any so-called key intel, important tactical advice provided by Pak;
· DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST PAKISTAN;
· Seek intel from India and Israel and cross-check Pak’s intel always.
Military tactics -
· Adopt pincer-like movement in cutting off AL- Qaeda /Taliban and taking them out (Pakistan to push from South and US/ISAF pushes from North) in Southern Afghanistan;
· Adopt similar tactics in other areas of Afghanistan;
· Use advanced technology to detect IED’s from distance, intercept messages, locate enemy, blast underground network etc.;
· Use devastating air attacks where civilian casualties are not likely at all;
· Increase troop levels in regions/areas as required.
· Allow some Taliban to escape to China’s Uyghur region, Iran to create trouble there.
Economic -
· Karzai to make sure job opportunities are visibly available and achievable to poor;
· Karzai to make sure small business opportunities are available to masses;
· Keep providing monetary and other aid to Afghanistan.
Set time frame for Karzai -
· Keep pressure on Karzai to develop further Afghanistan’s own security and police base/network in a given time frame (3-5 years)
· Evaluate periodically Karzai’s performance against given KPI’s
Other -
· On a dual track approach explore if some Taliban are willing to join democratic process (but do not get obsessed with finding out good Taliban / bad Taliban);
· Take out/eliminate private fund providers to Taliban (most of them operate in Gulf and ME, some in Europe);
· Keep up an international media blitz that moderate Islamic elements are being courted and radical elements being eliminated;
· Keep an eye on China’s game in region;
· US/NATO to maintain an unified, aligned and integrated approach.
· Do not piss India off.
With Pakistan -
· Adopt tough carrot and stick policy with Pakistani regime;
· Get Pakistan to live without being obsessed with India - provide Pakistan some non-harmful alternative reason to be proud of and be busy with;
· Keep continual pressure and vigilance on ISI – use carrot and stick with key people and buy their support/allegiance;
· Always double-check any so-called key intel, important tactical advice provided by Pak;
· DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST PAKISTAN;
· Seek intel from India and Israel and cross-check Pak’s intel always.
Military tactics -
· Adopt pincer-like movement in cutting off AL- Qaeda /Taliban and taking them out (Pakistan to push from South and US/ISAF pushes from North) in Southern Afghanistan;
· Adopt similar tactics in other areas of Afghanistan;
· Use advanced technology to detect IED’s from distance, intercept messages, locate enemy, blast underground network etc.;
· Use devastating air attacks where civilian casualties are not likely at all;
· Increase troop levels in regions/areas as required.
· Allow some Taliban to escape to China’s Uyghur region, Iran to create trouble there.
Economic -
· Karzai to make sure job opportunities are visibly available and achievable to poor;
· Karzai to make sure small business opportunities are available to masses;
· Keep providing monetary and other aid to Afghanistan.
Set time frame for Karzai -
· Keep pressure on Karzai to develop further Afghanistan’s own security and police base/network in a given time frame (3-5 years)
· Evaluate periodically Karzai’s performance against given KPI’s
Other -
· On a dual track approach explore if some Taliban are willing to join democratic process (but do not get obsessed with finding out good Taliban / bad Taliban);
· Take out/eliminate private fund providers to Taliban (most of them operate in Gulf and ME, some in Europe);
· Keep up an international media blitz that moderate Islamic elements are being courted and radical elements being eliminated;
· Keep an eye on China’s game in region;
· US/NATO to maintain an unified, aligned and integrated approach.
· Do not piss India off.
Saturday, March 14, 2009
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY AND THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT - ISI
In his first primetime press conference on 09 Feb when US President Obama didn’t mention the word ‘Taliban’ while responding to a question on his administration’s Afghanistan policy, it was clear something was cooking. The omission of the word ‘Taliban’ came as a bit of a surprise because till this presser whenever President Obama spoke about threats to US from Afghan-Pakistan area, he always mentioned Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the same breath.
Be that as it may, it is now clear that US does not wish to look at Taliban through one coloured lens – US wishes to distinguish between ‘good’ Taliban and ‘bad’ Taliban. Ostensibly, the motivation for this thinking comes from supposed success in Iraq where some Sunni elements hostile towards US apparently switched sides and started working with the coalition forces in fighting insurgency.
Clearly, US is trying to devise a strategy for Afghanistan which will prevent it from getting bogged down in that area in Vietnam-like manner. Hopefully, lessons learned from Vietnam are apparently being applied to make sure that US doesn’t have to leave Afghan theatre with a bloody nose, mutilated prestige and negative gain on the ledger.
Extending the logic of success in Iraq to Afghanistan is conceptually tenable. But what about translating that in to reality? Are the scenarios identical? What are the additional challenges? Surely, US strategists must have carried out necessary SWOT and other analyses – one hopes they did so! Incidentally, one had hoped that US had done necessary home work about post-Saddam scenario in Iraq also but sadly that proved to be so hopelessly untrue!
Anyway, it seems that US thinks that Taliban being a Sunni outfit will be amenable more or less in the same way as the Iraqi Sunni elements turned out to be. As well, the American policy makers are hoping that there will be support from Pakistan in making the new policy initiative successful. It seems that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is also in favour of this vector of new US Afghan policy.
But here is the fly in the ointment – Pakistan – and this could be potentially serious. Why? Because, Pakistan (through ISI) was a co-sponsor of Taliban when Soviets had occupied Afghanistan. But after the Soviets withdrew from that region, Pakistan (through ISI) continued to keep Taliban alive because it served them in more than one way.
By keeping Taliban alive and active, Pakistan’s dangerously shrewd and mean SOB's in politics and in ISI could continue to have foothold in Afghanistan, devilishly prise out American aid, keep fingering India, and last but not the least hold on to their positions of power.
Just to provide brief historical context, Pakistan’s former dictators Zial-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were America’s darlings because they were so good in licking the boots of their American masters and also convincing them that US interests in the region are safe with them (Zia or Musharraf). Taliban was a good pawn in this political chess game Pakistan played for last so many years vis-à-vis US.
Washington probably understood how the mean schmuck Pakistanis (including ISI) were pulling wool over US eyes but the Americans chose to ignore (if they didn’t understand the Pakistani game, then God bless them!). Anyway, after 9/11 things changed, albeit very slowly, in Washington. During his second term President Bush started realising there was more benefit in cooperating with India (e.g. civil nuclear cooperation).
In order to win India’s confidence US started to acknowledge, more in private though, the dangers posed by ISI's support to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Slowly, US started to acknowledge in public also the areas where Musharraf had to do more with regard to Pakistan's support to Taliban and Islamic insurgents than his usual theatricals.
But the 26/11 Mumbai attack completely changed everything. This attack reinforced the fact that Pakistan was indeed the epicentre of Islamic terrorism, and was playing double game with US with regard to Taliban and even Al-Qaeda. The reported killing of American intelligence operatives, and the Jews in the Mumbai attack forced the Americans to take serious note of Pakistan’s dubious role in the whole game.
Consequently, the Americans are infuriated, rightly so, and they want to get down to the bottom of the sinister plot. So are the Israelis, and given their unfettered clout in Washington they are kicking their American counterparts to punish the perpetrators. Both US and Israelis know the diabolical role of ISI in all this.
US probably is aware that Pakistan hates President Karzai and Pakistan will do everything possible to destabilise him. Taliban is one of the instruments Pakistan uses to play its dirty game against Karzai and anybody and everybody who support Karzai – including the American troops and ISAF. Pakistan plays this sinister game through ISI. No wonder American troops and ISAF are finding their task in containing Taliban getting difficult by the day.
Ultimately, Americans are now realising that it is about time they wielded the hobnailed boot with Pakistan and some how brought a stop to ISI’s support to Taliban. US knows (so does Canada and other constituents of ISAF) that unless ISI is disciplined and Pakistan stops providing safe haven to Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in FAR and NWFP, chances of gaining any upper hand against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is next to impossible.
US Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, eventually couldn’t be more candid about ISI. In an interview with PBS broadcast recently he said that (Pakistan Army Chief and de-facto boss of ISI) Kayani "certainly is aware of the concerns that I have with respect to his intelligence agency, ISI".
"They (ISI) have been very attached to many of these extremist organizations," Mullen said warning that "in the long run, they have got to completely cut ties with those in order to really move in the right direction". Kayani, he said, had appointed in Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, "one of his best guys", as the new director of ISI. "I'm encouraged with his views and I'm encouraged with how he sees the problem." But "it's going to take some time to get at it inside ISI".
So, in summary, the new US Afghan policy of engaging with ‘good’ Taliban may not bear any fruit whatsoever unless and until the chief actor of the dangerous Islamic insurgency game – Pakistan and ISI – is properly corralled and contained. US should learn from history (their strategists have a bad habit of not reading history) that elements in modern day Pakistan and the Afghan-Pak border areas could be contained only through sledge hammer policy (refer to early 20th century Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his general Hari Singh Nalwa’s tactics in the region).
One hopes President Obama and his advisors will learn from history and move forward carefully with force (and some carrots) without getting fooled by Pakistani chicanery. Only if they can do so, they will be able to minimise losses to American troops and ISAF and at the same time achieve their objective of containing Islamic insurgency threat to USA and other western countries. And while doing so for God’s sake US should not get blindsided and/or misguided by agenda-driven advice from the wily British. USA has for so long been deceived and misguided by British advice on South Asian matters. It is time US used its own brain while developing strategies for the Afghan-Pakistan theatre.
Be that as it may, it is now clear that US does not wish to look at Taliban through one coloured lens – US wishes to distinguish between ‘good’ Taliban and ‘bad’ Taliban. Ostensibly, the motivation for this thinking comes from supposed success in Iraq where some Sunni elements hostile towards US apparently switched sides and started working with the coalition forces in fighting insurgency.
Clearly, US is trying to devise a strategy for Afghanistan which will prevent it from getting bogged down in that area in Vietnam-like manner. Hopefully, lessons learned from Vietnam are apparently being applied to make sure that US doesn’t have to leave Afghan theatre with a bloody nose, mutilated prestige and negative gain on the ledger.
Extending the logic of success in Iraq to Afghanistan is conceptually tenable. But what about translating that in to reality? Are the scenarios identical? What are the additional challenges? Surely, US strategists must have carried out necessary SWOT and other analyses – one hopes they did so! Incidentally, one had hoped that US had done necessary home work about post-Saddam scenario in Iraq also but sadly that proved to be so hopelessly untrue!
Anyway, it seems that US thinks that Taliban being a Sunni outfit will be amenable more or less in the same way as the Iraqi Sunni elements turned out to be. As well, the American policy makers are hoping that there will be support from Pakistan in making the new policy initiative successful. It seems that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is also in favour of this vector of new US Afghan policy.
But here is the fly in the ointment – Pakistan – and this could be potentially serious. Why? Because, Pakistan (through ISI) was a co-sponsor of Taliban when Soviets had occupied Afghanistan. But after the Soviets withdrew from that region, Pakistan (through ISI) continued to keep Taliban alive because it served them in more than one way.
By keeping Taliban alive and active, Pakistan’s dangerously shrewd and mean SOB's in politics and in ISI could continue to have foothold in Afghanistan, devilishly prise out American aid, keep fingering India, and last but not the least hold on to their positions of power.
Just to provide brief historical context, Pakistan’s former dictators Zial-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were America’s darlings because they were so good in licking the boots of their American masters and also convincing them that US interests in the region are safe with them (Zia or Musharraf). Taliban was a good pawn in this political chess game Pakistan played for last so many years vis-à-vis US.
Washington probably understood how the mean schmuck Pakistanis (including ISI) were pulling wool over US eyes but the Americans chose to ignore (if they didn’t understand the Pakistani game, then God bless them!). Anyway, after 9/11 things changed, albeit very slowly, in Washington. During his second term President Bush started realising there was more benefit in cooperating with India (e.g. civil nuclear cooperation).
In order to win India’s confidence US started to acknowledge, more in private though, the dangers posed by ISI's support to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Slowly, US started to acknowledge in public also the areas where Musharraf had to do more with regard to Pakistan's support to Taliban and Islamic insurgents than his usual theatricals.
But the 26/11 Mumbai attack completely changed everything. This attack reinforced the fact that Pakistan was indeed the epicentre of Islamic terrorism, and was playing double game with US with regard to Taliban and even Al-Qaeda. The reported killing of American intelligence operatives, and the Jews in the Mumbai attack forced the Americans to take serious note of Pakistan’s dubious role in the whole game.
Consequently, the Americans are infuriated, rightly so, and they want to get down to the bottom of the sinister plot. So are the Israelis, and given their unfettered clout in Washington they are kicking their American counterparts to punish the perpetrators. Both US and Israelis know the diabolical role of ISI in all this.
US probably is aware that Pakistan hates President Karzai and Pakistan will do everything possible to destabilise him. Taliban is one of the instruments Pakistan uses to play its dirty game against Karzai and anybody and everybody who support Karzai – including the American troops and ISAF. Pakistan plays this sinister game through ISI. No wonder American troops and ISAF are finding their task in containing Taliban getting difficult by the day.
Ultimately, Americans are now realising that it is about time they wielded the hobnailed boot with Pakistan and some how brought a stop to ISI’s support to Taliban. US knows (so does Canada and other constituents of ISAF) that unless ISI is disciplined and Pakistan stops providing safe haven to Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in FAR and NWFP, chances of gaining any upper hand against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is next to impossible.
US Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, eventually couldn’t be more candid about ISI. In an interview with PBS broadcast recently he said that (Pakistan Army Chief and de-facto boss of ISI) Kayani "certainly is aware of the concerns that I have with respect to his intelligence agency, ISI".
"They (ISI) have been very attached to many of these extremist organizations," Mullen said warning that "in the long run, they have got to completely cut ties with those in order to really move in the right direction". Kayani, he said, had appointed in Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, "one of his best guys", as the new director of ISI. "I'm encouraged with his views and I'm encouraged with how he sees the problem." But "it's going to take some time to get at it inside ISI".
So, in summary, the new US Afghan policy of engaging with ‘good’ Taliban may not bear any fruit whatsoever unless and until the chief actor of the dangerous Islamic insurgency game – Pakistan and ISI – is properly corralled and contained. US should learn from history (their strategists have a bad habit of not reading history) that elements in modern day Pakistan and the Afghan-Pak border areas could be contained only through sledge hammer policy (refer to early 20th century Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his general Hari Singh Nalwa’s tactics in the region).
One hopes President Obama and his advisors will learn from history and move forward carefully with force (and some carrots) without getting fooled by Pakistani chicanery. Only if they can do so, they will be able to minimise losses to American troops and ISAF and at the same time achieve their objective of containing Islamic insurgency threat to USA and other western countries. And while doing so for God’s sake US should not get blindsided and/or misguided by agenda-driven advice from the wily British. USA has for so long been deceived and misguided by British advice on South Asian matters. It is time US used its own brain while developing strategies for the Afghan-Pakistan theatre.
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